Red China: A 21st Century Imperial Anachronism

Even though the most recent reports indicate that Chinese economic momentum is slowing, many still see it as a colossus that could outpace the United States in production and influence sometime this century.  China, however, faces considerable challenges.  Rapid industrialization has polluted entire regions.  Rivers have grown unusable, some large cities are too hazardous for  life.  Corruption and debt hamper its growth, just as they did France before its Revolution.  

China also must face a serious anachronism.  Despite its repeated revolutionary convulsions over the past century, it remains a multinational empire filled with ethnic groups chafing under government control.

This makes it resemble some of the polyglot empires facing trouble before World War I.  The Ottoman Empire, dominated by ethnic Turks, kept an uneasy control over Christian Greeks and Slavs.  It also ruled clans and tribes of Arabs, Kurds, Jews, and other groups.  Czarist Russia strained to control Muslims in Central Asia, Catholic Poles, Protestant Christians in Scandinavia and along the Baltic. Austria-Hungary tried to split power between its two major ethnic groups under one ruling family, but mainly alienated the other 13 peoples.

Decades later, the "nationalities problem" erupted under Gorbachev to help drive the Soviet Union into the dustbin of history.

China has to face this problem too, which may explain why the past year has seen them following in the path of the empires of old.  Trying to prop up internal unity by gaining risky external successes against old rivals. 

According to the 2000 Chinese census, published in the CIA World Factbook, 91 percent of the country's population is Han Chinese.  While this may look overwhelming, it must be remembered that the remaining nine percent add up to 140 million people, approximately the same population as the Russian Federation.  

Also, as the map shows, Han Chinese are concentrated into the eastern part of the country.  The southwest contains the formerly independent, Buddhist, and oft persecuted Tibetans.  The resentment of northwestern Muslims, mostly Turkic Uighurs, against the atheist regime occasionally boils over.  In the last few weeks, Chinese authorities imprisoned a prominent Uighur academic and advocate. 

Inner Mongolians side by side with independent Mongolia.  Traditionally this is a recipe for discontent. Three years ago, authorities feared the effects of major protests against Chinese rule.  Manchuria in the northeast has a high concentration of Han, but has traditionally been considered a separate people from the rest of China.  Much like Sicilians often do not consider themselves to be true Italians.

Significant divisions exist between the non Han 140 million.  But an economic downturn combined with the continued repressive policies of Beijing could unite them in hostility.  

China's aggressive moves against Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and the United States in the past year follow the pattern of the old imperial multinational states.  Concerns about economic decline and ethnic upheaval push their attention outward.  Although the imperial power usually fears the effect of war, it assumes the risk anyway, gambling that it will emerge stronger in the long run.  Unfortunately, such risks often do actually lead to war.  

Regardless of how strong China actually is, or is estimated to be, these kinds of actions have historically pointed to a perception of weakness.  China may perceive itself to be weakening relatively or absolutely.  Or think that it is vulnerable on other fronts.  Multinational empires tended in the past to believe that external shows of strength, aggression, and even bullying, would protect it externally and domestically.

And China is weakening.  Since 2010, each of its major ethnic groups have pushed back against government persecution and abuse.  Its economy, while certainly growing, likely was not developing nearly as fast as reported.  Authoritarian and totalitarian states accidentally encourage falsehood in economic reports because officials fear reporting unpleasant truth.  China also pours resources into ridiculous mammoth projects, much as the old Soviet Union, to try and prove its advancement.  

Most economic forecasts for 2014 predict problems for the Chinese economy.

Knowing the history of states in the situation and condition of 21st century China is helpful in predicting how to respond to emerging problems.  China may be pushing to join the modern economies, but it still is weighed down by problems of decades and even centuries ago.  

Those Who Will Not Learn From History . . .

Consider the scenario.  A Great Power who has dominated world affairs is in relative decline.  Production and wealth are expanding at much slower rates than other rising nations.  Some of those nations feel their own expanding strength; they aspire to find a "place in the sun."  So they try to carve out larger spheres of influence, challenge weaker partners of the dominant power, issue bellicose statements where diplomacy would work better.

A follower of current affairs will immediately recognize this as a description of China's effort to evolve from a regional into a world power.  Students of history will recognize the German Empire under the Kaiser.  His personal ambitions and insecurities vis-a-vis his British royal family relatives fused with the rising nationalism of the age.  The Kaiser was no evil nihilist like Hitler, but by following his own logical path he helped bring on a war that revolutionized Europe and destroyed his family's position.  Both are right.  The behavior of 21st century China mimics that of the Germans from exactly a century ago.  And one need not be an expert to know how that turned out.

At this moment, Vice President Biden is in the Far East.  He first visited Japan and is now in China. Biden's immediate goal is to personally reaffirm the United States' inflexibility on the issue of China's self-declared air defense zone.  In a not so subtle move last week, the U. S. Air Force flew several gigantic and loud B 52 strategic bombers over the defense zone.  China scrambled fighters, but offered no additional aggressive moves.  Xinhua News published the statement that "several combat aircraft were scrambled to verify the identities" of the US and Japanese aircraft.

Biden yesterday issued a special challenge to young Chinese to "challenge the government" to force change in a system they oppose.  He reminded the students applying for visas that in America, opposing the system is admired.

China proclaimed the air defense zone over a broad swath of the South China Sea that happens to include islands governed by Japan.  It also mostly covers international waters.  Most likely they announced it as a test of Obama's resolve.  Fortunately, Obama did strongly defend American and Japanese rights in the region.  But this is the latest in a long series of provocations.  China has forcefully argued claims against Vietnamese and Filipino territory and even claimed suzerainty over thousands of shipwreck sites.

A hundred years ago the Kaiser provoked two near war crises over Morocco, his navy shelled Venezuelan barrier islands, among other belligerent bullying actions.  His government believed that a hyper-aggressive stance everywhere from the Sahara to Samoa would win Germany respect in the world, especially from Britain.  This reversed the balancing act of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in the late 1800s. He sought to minimize risky conflicts while cultivating good personal relations with American leaders like Ulysses S. Grant.
The United States faces some of the same concerns as Britain a century ago.  Both the current US and the former British Empire had retooled their militaries to project power against disorganized and mostly non national opposition.  Both nations retained the means to project power (Royal Navy, US Air Force and Navy), but the armies emphasized small war concepts. This meant smaller forces relying on high levels of skill, technology, and experience.  The armies were also smaller in terms of ratio to population than potential adversaries.

Britain's pre-World War I army was annihilated within 18 months of the beginning of World War I.  It simply could not handle mass conventional warfare. Our current military does not have the resources to be ready for both a mass conventional and unconventional war at the same time.  Perhaps if less went to bureaucrats and more to actual fighting preparedness, this could be achieved.  The US, however, has often started major wars in a near skeleton state, ramping up to full mobilization fairly quickly.  Then again, it has never faced an adversary with the population and territorial size of China.

China is likely not determined to start a war.  This would cut it off from its largest market and automatically void America's massive debt.  The German Empire likewise did not want a continental war as it entered 1914.  Things can happen and events can move quickly, however.

If China, like 1941 Japan, saw war with the United States as inevitable, the time to strike would be 2015.  Obama has more chance of seeing a fully Republican Congress than one that stands behind him.  Striking before the 2014 election could give Obama an outside shot at a Democratic Congress.  He certainly would not hesitate to use a war as an excuse to push for one.

In 2015, the full effects of Obamacare will put the nation in economic and social turmoil.  Despite Obama's show of resolve over the defense zone, he remains a weak president with little political backing or ability.  Since a war would almost certainly result in a Republican hawk (Chris Christie comes to mind) winning the presidency in 2016, a China determined to strike would want as much lame duck Obama as they could get.

China has expanded their blue water naval capabilities, collected a number of bases far from their homeland, and has carefully built up a conventional first strike capability.

Where are some of the potential starting points?

1.)  Korea

World War I did not start because Germany attacked France and Britain.  Germany's ally Austria-Hungary suffered a terror attack encouraged by Russia's ally Serbia.  A long standing regional grievance flared into a European, then a World War.  How committed would China be in backing a foolish and unapproved move by North Korea. This state is less an obedient client of China and more of the obnoxious loud cousin.

2.)  Direct Strike on US and/or Japanese regional military assets

Chinese anti ship missiles are built to sink ships in one shot.  That being said, these missiles are crafted by the same country that has an epidemic of poorly built buildings falling over on their sides.  They should be feared, but they likely will have a low success rate.  But they are first strike weapons, make no mistake.

Because of the close alliance and Japan's post World War II constitution, an attack on Japan is tantamount to an attack on the United States itself.  But China might realistically question Obama's willingness to fully commit to a war to protect Japan.

3.)  India

The two countries have fought over a few barren strips of territory in the past.  India also has natural sympathy for the Tibetan Buddhists who continually oppose Chinese rule.  The recent pact could satisfy both sides or be a temporary fix.  Both are nuclear powers and China gets along better with Indian rival Pakistan.

4.)  Vietnam

Border disputes over islands, just like with Japan and the Philippines.  The difference is that China once ruled Vietnam as a vassal.  Vietnam never forgot and still regards China with suspicion.  In a post Cold War world, the United States actually has a better chance at good relations with Vietnam than China.

This is not to say that war will happen, or that it is even likely.  Then again, a far East conflagration is also firmly within the realm of possibility.

5.)  Russia (highly unlikely in short term)

Russia and China have grown closer in this century, focusing on their mutual distrust of American influence.  Territorial issues still divide them.  The Maritime Province, or Primorskya Oblast, was once Chinese territory seized under the Czars. It contains the major Russian port and naval base Vladivostok.  China regards this land as it once did Hong Kong, territory that will inevitably revert to Beijing's rule.  Russia disagrees.  Not a bone of contention now, but certainly potentially a problem in the future.

China, as a former imperial power and a regime currently bullying its neighbors, has a long list of potential adversaries should a general war break out.  Almost certainly the United States and Japan would form the core of the effort.  North Korea (perhaps China's closest bordering friend) involvement brings in the modern and well-trained military of South Korea.

Taiwan has every reason to fear Chinese hegemony in the Far East, but could convince itself that non belligerency could save it if China won the war.  It would not, but humanity has enormous powers of self-deception.

Definite maybes include Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain.  Britain's shrunken role as a Great Power has not deterred it from assisting the United States in opposing aggression. It remembers well the inability of Neville Chamberlain's goodwill in heading off Hitler.  Because Japan and the US would shoulder most of the load, the three British Commonwealth countries would.

Vietnam and the Philippines also have every reason to fear Chinese aggrandizement.  The former US colony sits right in the path of China's oceanic power play.  A Chinese victory would almost certainly reduce them to satellite status.  Both countries also have difficult geographical features and long traditions of guerrilla warfare that would cost China resources and benefit it very little.  Still, a Far Eastern general war would likely mean American use of the Philippines as a major base, something China would want to prevent.  The Philippines would very likely join.  Vietnam only if they felt menaced during the war or by the possible outcome.

India looms as possibly the next great English speaking democratic power.  It remains an X factor because the United States has done very little to cultivate good relations with this potential powerhouse.  Currently some in India have asked that the United States lift natural gas export restrictions. Purchasing from the United States, from their point of view, is both less expensive and better for their security concerns.

China, however, has a strong relationship with Iran.  Iran aggression coordinated with China could pose major problems for a Western alliance.

As the president has embarked on the 23 days of Obamacare and everyone follows along, it does not hurt to remind ourselves that foreign dangers lurk as well.

John F. Kennedy a Half Century Later: A Legacy of Effectiveness and Cheating

John F. Kennedy is an American paradox.  His smiling visage was what New Dealers and their protegees imagined themselves to be.  But Kennedy also reflected the corruption and dishonesty behind the attractive facade and earnestly stated intentions.  Like his successor Richard Nixon, Kennedy mixed idealism and pragmatism well.  Both were effective presidents. But neither could escape the temptations of shooting a few rounds of dirty pool.

Kennedy was the perfect convergence of image, style, and accomplishment.  He was a genuine war hero, served respectably in the US Senate, and seemingly outpaced the shadow surrounding his bootlegger, Nazi sympathizing father.

The campaign of 1960 should historically bury John F. Kennedy's legacy in the same grave as Richard Nixon.  Falsely campaigning in the general election on the missile gap perpetuated a serious fraud on the voters.  Kennedy knew, via national security estimate provided as a courtesy, that the US was comfortably ahead of the Soviet Union in weaponry.  Yet he played on fears stoked by the Soviets that they had reached parity.  Nixon could not refute the claims without breaking national security laws.  His silence on the issue cost him.

But if Kennedy had campaigned honestly, would he have even won nomination?

Justice Allen Loughry of the West Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals, penned a dissertation at American University that covered political scandals from 1960 until the 1990s.  The book published from it, Don't Buy Another Vote, I Won't Pay For a Landslide comes from Kennedy's glib reaction to accusations of cheating during that year.

Loughry's work draws from sources such as former political boss Raymond Chafin's Just Good Politics, among others.  It describes in detail how Kennedy campaign money appeared in southern West Virginia counties.  Once this money appeared, bosses supporting Hubert Humphreys overnight switched to Kennedy.   In those days, the bosses and their slate always won the day.  They had many loaves and fishes on the State Road Commission and public school system to distribute among helpful supporters.

And Ted Kennedy himself was in charge of Southern West Virginia, although no one has ever directly accused him of malfeasance.

Kennedy beat Nixon by a whisker in 1960.

Conservatives like to argue that Kennedy was not an effective president.  Setting aside one of the most corrupt presidential campaigns ever for now, did Kennedy govern effectively?

He did.  Kennedy understood that a strong national economy dovetailed into higher levels of respect for America around the globe, enhancing national security.  He also understood 15 years before Laffer drew his famous curve that lower taxes spurred economic growth.

That being said, he combined lower taxes with increasing domestic spending.  Chaffin actually demands the credit for giving Kennedy the idea about food stamps, but this could be a reach.  Domestic spending on welfare and development programs expanded, along with defense.  Kennedy wanted flexible response options, so his administration ratcheted up spending on weapons systems.

In foreign policy Kennedy was aggressively, maybe even recklessly interventionist in his thinking.  In 1961, he tried to convince his military leadership of the wisdom in deploying troops into Laos to fight Communist rebels.  This belies the liberal fairy tale that Kennedy would have avoided Vietnam.

In honesty, he may have torpedoed our main chance at victory by approving the assassination of South Vietnamese president Diem.  Imperfect as Diem was, that was a truly Roman Empire-esque action against an allied head of state.

The Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco does lay at Kennedy's door.  He was misinformed and inexperienced, but that was his fault.  Kennedy gets blamed for the Berlin Wall going up, but short of war no one could have stopped that.  The "ich bin ein Berliner" speech may have been awkward Deutsch, but Germans understood and remain thankful.

Kennedy's signature move represented leadership at its best.  After the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy listened to advice from the president he abused through much of 1960, Dwight Eisenhower.  He listened to his advisers as a group rather than one on one, learning lessons from their disputes.  Kennedy preserved American respect and strength without firing a shot.  He deserves tremendous credit for that.

Kennedy did make powerful moves in the service of civil rights.  He helped to rekindle J. Edgar Hoover's old hatred of the terrorist Ku Klux Klan.  Attorney General Robert Kennedy allowed Hoover to open up a bag of tricks on the Klan reminiscent of the Czarist Okhrana, plus adding a few of his own.  Whether or not one agrees that the tactics were justified, they worked.  Under Kennedy's presidency, Hoover broke the Klan.

The Civil Rights Act, however, would not pass in its most effective form until the chief executive behind it spoke with a Texas accent.

Kennedy deserves credit for some notable achievements and blame for policy missteps.  Overall, he served as an active, dynamic, and effective president with vision and ability, same as Nixon.

Both men, on the other hand, had crimes committed on their behalf that struck at the heart of the American democratic system.  In Watergate, staff broke into a locked office to spirit away secret campaign files (this also happened to Republicans in Washington state in 2008.)  Kennedy's 1960 campaign suborned Democratic Party officials at the local level in West Virginia to steal primary support.

It wasn't "just good politics."  It was a crime.  And few people outside of West Virginia have any interets in adding this to Kennedy's legacy.

The passage of time mellows the most intense of hatreds and even some hero-worshiping.

We owe it to history to start getting the story straight on President Kennedy.

Far East Dangers Rising On the Horizon

With all the news of China's blue water navy development in the past few years, another country's response fell under the radar.  Yesterday, however, the unveiling of Japan's newest "destroyer" raised questions.

The "destroyer" surpasses the size of any Japanese ship built since World War II.  To the uneducated (or, perhaps cynical) eye, the Izumo looks suspiciously like an aircraft carrier.  Its flat top deck, allegedly meant for helicopters, is four fifths as long as an American Nimitz class deck.  It also outstrips by about 200 feet the length of the Royal Navy's Illustrious class carriers

Izumo pointedly responds to China's purchase and reconstruction of a Soviet era carrier from Ukraine.

The bigger issue lies in the deteriorating relations between China and her neighbors, specifically Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

Territorial disputes between these nations lay dormant for years.  Recently, technological advances in identifying and extracting sea floor resources have raised the stakes in who owns what stretch of ocean bottom.  Vast natural gas and oil resources interest nations, such as China and Japan, that have little of either.
Interestingly, this issue has also separated Cold War partners Japan and the Nationalist Chinese government based in Taiwan.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States played referee to the region.  Although domestically debated later, the willingness to fight in Korea and Vietnam gave friends assurance and enemies pause.  Few doubted America's willingness to fight for Japan, South Korea, Nationalist China, or other friends.  Moreover, few believed that the US had any goals in the Far East beyond maintaining the status quo.

American power, relatively speaking, has receded in the region as China spent more on expanding and modernizing its warmaking ability.  It also has launched cyberattacks against its opponents' government and business concerns.

Unfortunately for the United States, the Chinese urge to revise the Far East balance of power echoes the shadows of a century ago.

In 1913, the British Empire managed the world power dynamic through a powerful navy and economic productive might.  The German Empire under Kaiser William II aspired to "a place in the sun."  This meant military might, colonial expansion, and international respect on par with the British.

They made an unwise alliance with unstable Austria-Hungary, which was locked in perpetual disputes with Russia over control of southeastern Europe.  When Russia's client state of Serbia served as the base of a devastating terror attack on Austria-Hungary, the clumsy attempt to settle the score touched off World War I.

Similar dynamics are emerging now.  China is setting itself against Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam in its territorial disputes.  It has an unstable client in North Korea whose unpredictability could touch off a war with Japan or South Korea.  It is trying, like Germany in the early 1900s, to build a fleet that can regionally challenge the first rank power.

In other words, a pattern is emerging that could unravel decades of generally peaceful relations among states that despise and fear each other.

China's bold actions mirror those of other states that fear internal discord and try to rally the people around external successes.  It built a middle class, but never allowed it political participation.  That has been the downfall of many authoritarian regimes.  Questions about its debt and actual production numbers lend uncertainty to the perception that it is an economic power fated to outstrip the United States.

This also comes at a time when the Middle East's foundations of stability are collapsing, leftist regimes have come to power in Latin America, and Europe continues to live on the precipice of debt disaster.

Events have pushed the world's nations and people towards a time where only the brilliance of a Prince Otto von Bismarck could restore the balance.  It would be in America's interest to produce such a figure because a war in the Far East would inevitably draw us in.  And like Germany in the late 1800s and early 1900s, very few possible scenarios, even in victory, leave the US better off.

Is Obama turning Afghanistan in to his Vietnam?

As President Obama struggles whether or not to go for the win in Afghanistan we are reminded of a very similar decision made by a President over 40 years ago. General Westmoreland became Chief of Staff of the Army in March of 1968, just as North Vietnamese Army was destroyed by US forces at the end of the Tet Offensive. The media did not report this victory as the victory it was and the public was weary of the war. Westmoreland’s request for 200,000 additional troops had been leaked to the media and was ultimately denied for political reasons.

Today a similar request for additional troops sits on Obama’s desk. History repeats its self at General Stanley McChrystal's request for an additional 40,000 troops was leaked to the press.

Obama should learn from history. The first lesson is let the General fight the wars and keep the politics out of it. If Obama does not give the troops to McChrystal to push to final victory, then American soldiers will continue to die with no chance of victory. That is not an acceptable out come. We do not need another Vietnam.

The way I see it Obama has two choices. The first, if you will not give the troops what they need to win, then pull them out immediately. Do not sacrifice American lives without the chance of victory. However Mr. Obama needs to be prepared for what will follow. Afghanistan will revert back to the haven for terrorist bent on destruction of the United States and the western world. History also shows us that it will destabilize Pakistan, a nuclear armed country.

The second choice is not to repeat the mistakes of Vietnam. Keep politics out of it. Give the Generals what they need to push on to final victory. Win the war and keep America safe.

Nixonian Foreign Policy and Obama

A couple of days ago, I described Hillary Clinton's foreign policy as being that of Richard Nixon and the more I thought about it, the more I felt that point needed clarification.

Nixon's main achievements came in the field of foreign policy. Lyndon Johnson's tax and spend approach to welfare combined with his mismanagement of the Vietnam War led to a period of American weakness. High inflation, breakdowns of social cohesion, and a declining ability to project power meant that by the late 60s, that weakness was real. Nixon adjusted US policy accordingly. For the first time since World War II, we dealt from a position of weakness rather than one of strength. This required Nixon, more so than other presidents, to engage enemies with despicable domestic records. Mao Tse Dong was the worst of the lot. However, Nixon did this with an overall vision of m,aking our enemies (USSR and China) more afraid of each other than of us. It worked, giving us breathing room before the American Renaissance of Ronald Reagan.

Obama has insisted that we show disrespect to our friends and love to our enemies (who use the opportunity to slap us in the face when they get the chance.) It is the Nixon concept of engaging enemies, without the overall plan of how to use that engagement to secure security. What is most galling is that at the end of 2008 the United States was the most secure and strongest power in the world. Obama's excessive borrowing has placed us at the mercy of our adversaries. His policy of apologizing for every slight, real or imagined, has dissolved the international respect so carefully established by Bush and Rice.

So a point of clarification. I used Nixon to describe Clinton and Obama's policy because liberals believe that Nixon is worse than Hitler and Judas Iscariot rolled into one. However it does use some aspects of Nixon's process without the overall vision or savvy that will lead to an enhanced American security.

Ghosts of Christmases Past

I have found that the Christmases that don't look like Norman Rockwell's usually prove to be just as memorable as any others. Christmas 1967, which I spent near the DMZ in Vietnam, is one I remember vividly and fondly even after forty years.

We were awash in greeting cards, home-made cookies and candy, and little gifts which were sent to "a Marine in Vietnam" by total strangers. We had posters signed by school children all around the mess hall. The press would present those times as cruel ones for soldiers and Marines shunned and reviled by society, but we were actually very well-remembered, and not just by our own friends and families.

Christmas Eve we went to Midnight Mass in a large and lovely church in the countryside near Quang Tri, the roof of which was mostly missing. A Vietnamese priest, a French priest and a Lutheran chaplain concelebrated the Mass. Probably not even Pope John XXIII could have approved of that arrangement, but fortunately all concerned thought it better not to ask. We sang verses of "Silent Night" alternately in French, Vietnamese and English. We all sang "Adeste Fideles" in Latin, and each nationality sang one favorite Christmas carol in its own language during communion . The Marines sang "O Little Town of Bethlehem," and, my, did it sound amazing sung softly and a capella by three or four hundred men.

That Christmas there was a 48 hour truce, so we were given two beers each. (The Marines did not allow alcohol in the combat zones, so this was quite an unusual treat). On Christmas Day we (the regimental command group) loaded into a couple of Amtracs and went all over northern Quang Tri Province visiting the Marines at each location, and on Christmas night, instead of the usual command post operations, we played cards and board games. I only played bridge twice in Vietnam, and that was one of the times.